CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. v Cuomo, ___ NY3d___, 2016 NY Slip Op 04251 [2016]

The Court of Appeals issued a short decision here about a court’s lack of authority to entertain a post-judgment motion for statutory interest. Before universalizing it and jumping to the conclusion that the courts’ general authority to amend an erroneous or incomplete judgment has somehow been restricted, it is important to realize is that this was an Article 78 proceeding, and its specific and unusual procedural situation renders the decision of limited scope.

Petitioner was the sponsor of a condominium in Manhattan, and filed an offering plan with the respondent Attorney General requiring the purchasers’ down payments to be placed in escrow. If the first closing did not take place by September 1, 2008, the purchasers were entitled to their down payments back, with accumulated interest.

The first closing did not take place by September 1, 2008, and the purchasers demanded the return of their down payments, but the Petitioner refused, arguing that the 2008 date was a scrivener’s error. The correct date, it argued, was September 1, 2009. The purchasers applied to the Attorney General, who held in their favor and directed the return of the down payments with accumulated interest.

That order was the subject of this Article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court denied the petition, directed the return of the down payments with accumulated interest (that is, with the interest earned by the escrow fund, saying nothing about interest at the statutory rate under CPLR 5001), and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed.

While that appeal was pending, the purchasers moved for the imposition of interest at the statutory rate, and it is that motion which concerns us now. Supreme Court granted the motion and entered a judgment for $4.9 million in interest. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that once the Attorney General’s order had been upheld and the proceeding dismissed, all issues had been resolved and Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to address the question of interest. Additionally, it held that CPLR 5001 did not apply, and the purchasers would not have been entitled to pre-judgment interest anyway, since the offering plan was not a contract.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding simply that the order dismissing the proceeding was a final judgment, and Supreme Court was thereafter without jurisdiction to entertain the Post-judgment motion for interest. It did not address the issue of whether interest would have been appropriate had the purchasers moved for it prior the the entry of the order.

The Court’s lack of elaboration of its holding might lead some to conclude that it applies to all situations. It should not be inferred from this decision that a court never has jurisdiction to amend a judgment after it has been entered. The key is that the Court cited to CPLR 7806 and not a more general section such as CPLR 5016. This decision should be regarded as applying to its specific fact pattern and context in an Article 78 proceeding where the issues directly presented by the petition had been resolved by the order.