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CPLR 205

Malay v City of Syracuse,

___ NY3d ___, 2015 NY Slip Op 04164

CPLR 205(a) allows a litigant a six-month extension of the limitations period in which to re-commence an action when suit was in fact timely commenced, but terminated for a reason other than a final judgment on the merits (there are a few other exclusions, not relevant here). In calculating the end point of the extension, it is of course essential to fix the date the first action terminated. The question presented to the Court of Appeals here was where to fix the termination date where the order of dismissal was appealed as of right, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to perfect.

Plaintiff originally sued in federal court, combining federal civil rights claims and state negligence claims. The federal claims were dismissed on September 30, 2011, and the District Court declined to retain jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiff appealed as of right to the Second Circuit, but failed to perfect her appeal. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal effective July 10, 2012. The failure to perfect was intentional, the plaintiff having decided that she could proceed to trial in the state courts more quickly than she could prosecute her appeal in the Second Circuit. She commenced her action in Supreme Court, Onondaga County, on June 25, 2012. That is to say, her state court action was untimely if the federal action terminated with the District Court’s dismissal order, but timely if it terminated with the dismissal of the appeal.

The Court of Appeals held that the termination date, for purposes of CPLR 205 (a), was the date of dismissal of the appeal, and the state court action had therefore been commenced within the extension period.

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Matter of Town Bd. of Town of Brighton v West Brighton Fire Dept., Inc.,

126 A.D.3d 1433 [4th Dept., 2015]

This hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action was commenced in the name of the Town Board to compel the respondent-defendant Fire Department to comply with a contract between it and the Town Board. The initial problem was that the Town Board has no capacity to sue in its own name: that authority is lodged by the Town Law in the town itself. The Town Board may direct its officers to institute the action, but the action must be in the name of the town. Dismissal is not required, however, as the irregularity may be corrected under CPLR 2001, the Town substituted for the Board, and the caption amended accordingly.

See, for another example, Villafane v Banner, 87 Misc2d 1037 [1976], where the infant plaintiff’s grandmother and foster parent purported to sue as “natural guardian.” The informal arrangement, though of long standing, did not rise to the level of “legal custody,” and so the grandmother lacked capacity to sue. There was still no need to dismiss the complaint, and the proper remedy was a nunc pro tunc appointment and substitution of a guardian ad litem. Read More